Bange septemberdagen 1944 (2)

Hoe was de toestand op de avond van 10 september? Duitse troepen hadden de lijn Leopoldsburg-Hechtel nog stevig in handen, zodat er dus in Lommel weinig hoop was op een snelle bevrijding door de Engelsen.

De Strijd om Hechtel vond plaats tussen Duitse elitetroepen en geallieerde Welsh Guards . Het ging om een eerste vorm van georganiseerde Duitse tegenstand na de doorbraak in Normandië. Tijdens de hevige gevechten, die één week duurden, werd het centrum van Hechtel nagenoeg volledig verwoest. Er vielen enkele honderden slachtoffers, onder hen ook burgers. Op 6 september 1944 slaagden Duitse achterhoedetroepen van de Wehrmacht erin om met enkele strategisch geplaatste kanonnen de geallieerde opmars van Hasselt richting Nederland aan het verkeersknooppunt van Hechtel te vertragen. Speciaal uit Duitsland aangevoerde Fallschirmjäger nestelden zich in Hechtel. Het kwam tot huis-aan-huis-gevechten. De strijd spitste zich toe nadat geallieerde Irish Guards op 10 september een omsingelende beweging in noordoostelijke richting via Eksel en Overpelt maakten. Zij slaagden erin vanaf fabrieksterreinen in Overpelt brug nummer 9 in het aangrenzende Lommel (meer bepaald Lommel-Barrier) in handen te krijgen, wat een Duitse aftocht in noordelijke richting onmogelijk maakte. De Duitse para's in Hechtel werden omsingeld. Op 12 september gaven zij zich over. De zeven dagen lange strijd kostte het leven aan ruim negentig Britse en ongeveer 150 tot 300 Duitse soldaten. Zesendertig inwoners van Hechtel kwamen om. De meesten van hen werden door de Duitsers zonder enige reden of proces gefusilleerd.

In 2004 hebben zowel Gerard Wuyts als Jef Bussels hierover uitgebreid verslag gedaan in hun respectieve publicaties: Herfststorm over Hechtel (Wuyts) en De slag om Hechtel: bevrijdingsgevechten 2 - 12 september 1944 (Bussels).

 

 Het kruispunt in Hechtel na de verwoestingen

Maar we lopen vooruit, want we zouden het hebben over 10 september. Bij valavond kregen Britse manschappen van de Irish Guards de ondermijnde brug bij een verrassingsaanval vanaf het aanpalende industriecomplex in Overpelt ongeschonden in handen. Op dat moment leverden Duitse elitetroepen in het 12 km zuidelijker gelegen Hechtel nog hevige gevechten met de Welsh Guards in de Slag om Hechtel. Via een omsingelingsbeweging in noordoostelijke richting langs Eksel, Overpelt en Neerpelt slaagden de Irish Guards erin het kanaal te bereiken. Door de verovering van de brug werd terugtrekkende Duitse troepen uit Hechtel de pas afgesneden. In de daaropvolgende dagen poogden de Duitsers de brug tevergeefs te heroveren, o.a. met bajonetgevechten en troepenversterkingen, waarbij ook burgerslachtoffers vielen. De brug kreeg van de Britten de naam Joe's Bridge als eerbetoon aan luitenant-kolonel John Ormsby Evelyn Vandeleur (initialen J.O.E.), bevelhebber van de Irish Guards. Een gedenksteen aan de voet van de brug herinnert aan de gebeurtenis op 10 september 1944.

Het verhaal van de verovering van brug 9 werd reeds uitgebreid uit de doeken gedaan in 1992 door J. Israël in zijn boek De Brug tot Market Garden; Met de bevrijding van Lommel, Overpelt, Neerpelt en Valkenswaard,  maar we kunnen niet aan de verleiding weerstaan om ook terug te grijpen naar een verslag van de Irish Guards zelf: 

Deze foto dateert wellicht van enkele dagen na de verovering van de brug op 10 september.

15.00-16.30hrs
The two Bns move up the left CL, a disused railway, and reformed N of the station 335861 in the order: No. 1 Sqn (Major D.A. PEEL) and No. 2 Coy (Capt. A. HENDRY) combined HQs, No. 3 Coy and No. 3 Sqn, No. 4 Coy and No. 2 Sqn, and No. 1 Coy in reserve on the backs of ARVs, Honeys and any odd vehicle.
Our orders were to harbour in EXEL, which was reached and found clear at 16.00hrs . Almost at once further orders came to push on N to OVERPELT by a German military road and try to seize the main bridge at GROOTE BARRIER which was not yet blown, before dark. The HCR ahead had reported the road clear as far as the factory, where a patrol was observing the bridge. This was strongly defended by 88s and prepared for demolition.
The Commanding Officer immediately dispatched a Honey patrol to contact the HCR at the factory 3(?)51955 with all speed and ordered the column to advance NORTH.
19.45hrs
The HCR patrol was contacted and reported the bridge still not blown, and confirmed the presence of at least 2 88s on the N side of the bridge. Major PEEL’s Squadron after a very fast drive halted just short of the factory to close up and receive orders. The Commanding Officer stressed the great importance for future preparations of capturing the bridge intact, and ordered Major PEEL to attack and rush it a soon as possible. Being out of range either of the guns or the wireless we could have no artillery support.
Major PEEL then moved his Squadron up to the factory gates, debussed the infantry Coy, and rightly appreciating that any guns defending the bridge would be sited either on or near its N end or at the X rds S of it 353956 made his plan accordingly. The leading Troop No. 3, Lt. LAMPARD’s was to patrol slowly forward, towards the X rds accompanied by its infantry platoon (Lt J STANLEY-CLARKE) while the rest of the Squadron took up position at the bend of the road, Sqn HQ firing W to the X rds and No. 2 Troop Sjt BELL and No. 1 Troop L/Sjt SMITH firing at the bridge and it approaches. All tanks were ordered to keep up heavy Browning and HE fire, to discourage the German gunners. Covered by Sqn HQ, Lt. LAMPARD’s troop moved up towards the X rds and got his tanks into position 30 yds short of it to observe and fire on the bridge.
Major D.A. PEEL then dismounted and agreed with the Coy Commander that the leading troop and Platoon should rush the bridge, and if successful be followed across by the rest of the Group. He ordered Lt. D. LAMPARD to make his own plan with Lt. STANLEY-CLARKE. Meanwhile Lt. D LAMPARD caught an 88 being towed across the bridge and knocked it out.
Another gun opened fire on him from the N end of the bridge but without effect. He then moved is troop up to the X rds and place his tanks among the houses on both sides of the road. L/Sjt McGURREN’s tank left, Sjt STEER’s and his own right. His fourth tank got a jammed case and had to withdraw from the action. As L/Sjt McGURREN crossed the road a third 88 fired on him from the cutting W of the bridge missed and merely got a heavy burst of Browning in return.
As Lt. D. LAMPARD’s rear and left were now secure, Sqn HQ switched its fire to the bridge, which now had 11 tanks shooting at it. Lt. LAMPARD dismounted and agreed with Lt. STANLEY-CLARKE to cover his platoon up the main road to within 100 yards of the bridge, when a GREEN VEREY light would be fired. This was a signal for all guns to fire only on the bridge; and when the infantry were ready for the final assault a RED VEREY light would be fired as a signal for all fire to cease and the leading tanks to charge.
It was 20.30hrs when the infantry moved down the road, took up their paositon and fired the GREEN VEREY light. For two minutes very heavy Browning fire came down on the bridge, which was now lit up by a house blazing on the right. The RED VEREY light went up and the tanks charged. L/Sjt McGURREN’s hit the corner of a house and stuck, so only Sjt STEER’s leading and Lt. LAMPARD’s actually did the assault. They went flat out, past the front section, over the bridge and halted in posn the N side. The infantry doubled close behind, came under fire Spandau on the road which was quickly knocked out by the Sherman and lay down around the tanks.
The ammunition of the knocked out 88 now began exploding on the bridge, but Major PEEL at once ordered the rest of the group to join Lt. LAMPARD on the far side. A Sapper officer Lt. HUTTON, with a party of 4 Guardsmen from 3rd Bn, followed the leading platoon, and climbed over the side of the bridge to cut the cables and remove the detonators of the charges on the piers.
The Commanding Officer then sent No. 3 Sqn and No. 3 Coy to reinforce No. 1 Sqn with all speed and take up position on the left of the road. The Combined HQ and reserve Sqn and Coys meanwhile formed a hedgehog between X rds and the S end of the bridge.
We then reported back on the HCR link that the bridge was captured intact and securely held and our success caused great joy in Higher Formations.
The Bns dug in for the night, awaiting a counter attack. But none came - not even a shell or mortar bomb.
Two unhappy prisoners of War captured by No. 1 Sqn from the infantry platoon that was supposed to protect the 88s said that the speed of our attack and advance had taken the gun crews, who were expecting their tank not ours that evening, completely by surprise. The fate of their fellow comrades on the bridge and the very heavy Browning and HE fire first put them off their aim and then made them remove to a safer if less heroic place. The Serjeant in charge of the demolition squad, in spite of a stirring speech he had made to the garrison earlier in the day that “the bridge must and will be blown” “that every man fights to the last round”, was one of the first to leave, forgetting to press the switch. Their officer had fled the day before - again after some bellicose words.

Bijzonder heldhaftig bij deze brugverovering was de 34 jaar oude Major David Arthur Peel, die helaas de volgende dag zou sneuvelen aan de voet van de brug. Over hem vonden we volgende tekst:

* On the evening of 10 Sep 44, during the advance to the ESCAUT CANAL, Major PEEL was in command of No. 1 Squadron, 2 Armoured Bn Irish Guards. Major PEEL was ordered to capture the bridge over the canal at DE GROOTE BARRIER; this bridge was known to be prepared for demolition, although it was believed to be still intact. As soon as the first tank exposed itself, the enemy opened fire with an anti-tank gun. Major PEEL at once directed the fire of his Squadron on to the bridge, while he himself went on foot to reconnoitre the German position. The bridge was found to be held by three 88mm guns and a large number of infantry. Major PEEL immediately ordered a troop to charge the bridge at speed under the covering fire of the remainder of the Squadron. He himself crossed the bridge with the leading troop. The speed and energy with which this attack was conducted resulted in complete success; the bridge was captured intact in spite of the obvious enemy intention to deny it to us at all costs. The success of this operation was very largely due to Major PEEL’s courage and determination to close with the enemy. Throughout the action he displayed a complete disregard for personal safety. The consistently high standard of leadership and gallantry displayed by this officer have been a constant source of inspiration to his Squadron.

Deze Majoor Peel was een kleinzoon van Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850), die premier was geweest van het Verenigd Koninkrijk in de jaren 1834-1835 en 1841-1846.

In de eerste aflevering van deze mini-reeks beloofden we om het Kriegstagebuch van de Duitse troepen op de voet te volgen. Tegen halftwee in de nacht van 10 op 11 september was daar het nieuws doorgedrongen en het verwekte er een stroom van paniek. Een uurtje later reeds bulderde het Duitse hoofdkwartier dat de door de Engelsen veroverde brug onmiddellijk terug « vijandvrij » moest gemaakt worden ! Vluchtende Duitse soldaten moesten onverbiddelijk neergeknald worden! Lees maar :

01.30 Uhr:

Meldet aus Walkenswaard der vom Gen.Kdo., zur Erkundung entsandte Offizier (Hpt. Wagner):

Es strömt alles zurück, Sturmgeschützbesatzungen, Pioniere, Flakbedienungen, Feldersatz – Batl.

Offiziere nicht aufzufinden. Der Engländer ist mit 3 Panzern und Infanterie über den Kanal bei der Brücke nördlich

Helchteren (Broeseind). Die Brücke ist nicht gesprengt, das letzte Sturmgeschütz soll sie in Brand geschossen haben.

Über die Brücke 2 km nördlich Lommel ist der Engländer auch herüber.

01.45 Uhr:

Meldet vorgeschobener Gefechtsstand 85.I.D., Oblt. Reifenstein: Nach Meldung des Feldwebels  Dammann, 1 Komp.Feldersatz-Batl.347, von Brücke nördlich Lommel ist Brücke

Broeseind unzerstört in Feindeshand gefallen. Feindliche Panzer kurven nördlich und nordostwärts davon umher und schiessen. Brücke ist vom Feind infanteristisch gesichert. Nördlich der Brücke Brände.

01.50 Uhr:  

Auftrag an Hptm. Wagner:

Sofort zur Ortskommandantur Eindhoven zurückfahren, dort zusammen mit Kommandant Widerstand organisieren und alles, was zurückflutet festhalten. Soldaten, die sich zu drücken versuchen, sind sofort zu erschiessen.

02.30 Uhr:

Anruf Major Berlin, Ia, Fsch.A.O.K.1 Befehl vom Oberbefehlshaber, Generaloberst Student:

Die vom Feind genommene Brücke Broeseind, Strasse Hasselt – Eindhoven, ist vom Süden her wieder zu nehmen und vom Feinde zu säubern. Mit Durchführung der Unternehmung wird Generalleutnant Chill, Kdr. 85.I.D.,beauftragt. Der dem Oberbefehlshaber zur Durchführung verantwortlich ist. Oberst Halberstadt wird befohlen, dass von den 3 Flakbatterien, die auf Befehl O.B. bei Eindhoven zusammenzuziehen sind, aus den Abschnitten der 719.I.D., 85.I.D. und 176.I.D. je eine schwere Flakbatterie fortzuziehen sei. Die von Oberst Halberstadt geplante Massnahme von 85.I.D. 2 bis 3 Falkbatterien wegzuziehen wurde vom Chef des Gen. Stabes ausdrücklich verboten.